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Abstract 
This paper provides evidence that university-industry collaboration is important for turning 
commercial opportunities into patents. The results suggest that researchers who receive a large 
share of research grants from industry have a higher propensity to file a patent. Small 
dissemination grants generally exert a positive effect, whether they come from industry or not. It 
also finds that these interactions do not increase the number of industry owned patents alone but 
benefit universities’ commercialisation efforts in general. 
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1  Introduction 
Universities have traditionally been an important source for knowledge creation and economic 
growth as they support industrial innovation through solving fundamental research problems (e.g. 
Aghion et al., 2008; Gibbons and Johnston, 1975; Nelson, 1986) and contribute directly through 
licensing of inventions resulting from their research (e.g. Henderson et al., 1998; Thursby and 
Kemp, 2002). Since the 1980s universities have become increasingly proactive in their 
commercialisation efforts and the number of academic staff involved in patenting has increased 
dramatically (e.g. Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Siegel et al., 2007; Verspagen, 2006). 
Numerous studies have investigated the determinants of academic patenting activity and have 
found several factors that potentially affect a researcher’s propensity to patent. Firstly, many 
papers stress the importance of patenting support provided through the commercialisation unit of 
the university and through financial incentives in form of royalties (Lach and Schankerman, 
2008; Thursby and Kemp, 2002). A second body of literature has focused on the link between 
scientific and commercial activity of individual researchers by measuring their publications (e.g. 
Azoulay et al., 2007; Stephan et al. 2007). Some recent papers, especially in the field of 
organisational behaviour, have further highlighted that the influence of peers or mentors on 
researcher’s attitudes towards commercialisation is one of the main factors for continuous 
entrepreneurial efforts (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Ozgen and Baron, 2007; Stuart and Ding, 
2006). 
This paper aims to contribute to the latter stream of patenting literature by empirically 
investigating the influence of partners from industry on academic patenting. Interviews with 
engineers conducted by Agrawal and Henderson (2002) suggest that interactions with industry 
can steer academics towards commercialisation. Further, they can help academics to recognise 
opportunities for commercialisation (Ozgen and Baron, 2007). This points to the possibility that 
industry partners influence a researcher’s attitude towards patenting as well as their perceived 
opportunities, resulting in an increase in patenting activity. However, not all industry grants may 
have the same purpose. Hottenrott and Lawson (2012) show that research motivated by small and 
medium-sized enterprises has a positive effect on patenting rates while large firms effect 
patenting negatively. This paper differs between small and large grants, assuming that the latter is 
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designed to support research and produce publications while the first enables dissemination and 
knowledge transfer. Large grants are mainly provided by public agencies with few large grants 
coming from industry. However, Thursby et al. (2009) and Verspagen (2006) point at such joint 
research projects as a source of industry owned patents in a US and European context. Thus, the 
large sponsoring contracts with industry may indeed increase patenting opportunities for 
researchers. Small grants on the other hand are an indicator of close links to a sponsor and may 
include consulting contracts, part-time appointments, joint student supervision and knowledge 
transfer grants. Thursby et al. (2009) assume that such consulting contracts may hold a better 
explanation for industry owned academic patents. 
This paper uses data from a 12-year panel of 492 engineering academics in the UK, and is 
able to measure industry interaction in terms of direct grants received from private firms. The 
data further allow us to differ between large research grants and small dissemination grants with 
industry. We are thus able to investigate whether there is a differential effect for large- and small-
scale collaborations with industry.  
The results show that UK researchers receiving funding from industry are more likely to 
produce patents, controlling for a variety of individual and departmental characteristics. Thus, as 
already argued by e.g. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) or Owen-Smith and Powell (2001), the 
support of pro-commercialisation partners is key in steering researchers towards patenting. We 
find the effect of an industry partner to be strongest and most consistent in explaining the 
propensity to patent, indicating a pull or learning effect from industry. Partners from industry 
perhaps have a strong interest in pushing academics towards commercialisation to recover their 
research investments or are more likely to sponsor research for commercial application. However, 
the effect is even stronger for university owned patents indicating that industry involvement 
generally increases a researcher’s preparedness to involve in patenting. Small grants have a 
positive effect on patenting regardless the source of the grant. These small grants, which may 
support dissemination activities, studentships and consulting are indicative of close links to 
sponsors and researchers’ ability to source money for knowledge transfer and other research 
dissemination activities, including patenting. 
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews existing literature, section 3 summarises 
the data and introduces the methodology, Section 4 presents the results and section 5, finally, 
concludes. 
2  Prior Literature 
Prior literature has shown that the support provided through the university is essential for 
successful patenting. Since the 1980s most universities in the US and across Europe have 
established commercialisation units (e.g. Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs)) to better identify 
commercial opportunities, provide expertise for efficient patenting and to source potential 
licensees of university inventions. Characteristics of these commercialisation units and the share 
of licensing revenue have indeed been found to positively influence the number of invention 
disclosures (e.g. Lach and Schankerman, 2008; Siegel et al., 2003; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; 
Thursby et al., 2009). Thus, activities of the university may increase the willingness of academic 
staff to patent and license, and encourage strategic choices in the dissemination of research 
(Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Thursby and Thursby, 2002). Although these findings suggest 
university policies and culture to have a strong impact on commercialisation activities, not all 
researchers are involved in patenting equally and there exists evidence for a skewed patenting 
process (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Azoulay et al., 2007; Thursby and Thursby, 2007). 
Individual factors appear to be far more important than institutional setting. 
Research focussing on individual characteristics that may determine academics’ patenting 
activities have mainly focussed on the relationship with publishing. It has repeatedly been argued 
that patents could potentially result from any applied research project that also generates 
publications. Agrawal and Henderson (2002), for instance, cite an engineering faculty member at 
MIT saying, "most patentable research is also publishable" (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002, p. 
58). Indeed, both activities can be complementary, as the effort associated with both and the 
nature of research do not differ (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Hence, academics with the ability to 
conduct scientific research successfully also have the assets to produce commercial outputs. 
Accordingly, research by Zucker et al. (1998) suggests that researchers with an excellent 
publication record are also most likely to patent their research (see also Di Gregorio and Shane, 
2003; Louis et al., 2001; Murray and Stern, 2007). Recent empirical work confirms the positive 
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impact of publication numbers on the propensity to patent (Calderini et al., 2007; Carayol, 2007; 
Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2008; Stephan et al., 2007). Studies by Breschi et al. (2005) on 
engineering academics in Italy, and Azoulay et al. (2007) on US scientists in life sciences, for 
example, report a positive correlation between the number of publications and patenting events. It 
therefore appears that academic research in terms of publications creates opportunities for 
commercial activities and that the two are closely linked. 
None of these studies, however, addresses the relationship between research funding and 
patenting. Research funding, especially in applied engineering science, is essential to acquire 
laboratory equipment required for research and allows the employment of research assistants. 
Accordingly, surveys by Zucker et al. (1998) and Link et al. (2007) find that experience in 
managing grants leads to more effective patenting. Moreover, access to funding may support 
patenting directly through the provision of expertise by the funding agent or specific 
appropriation requirements of the grant. However, again, not all researchers receiving external 
grants pursue commercialisation of their research equally. While scientific experience and 
funding enable academics to produce and better recognise potentially patentable research, the 
academic may simply not ascribe high value to commercial activities. Traditionalists amongst 
academic researchers might indeed feel that commercialisation threatens academia and that the 
two should be distinct (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001). 
Building on this evidence, this paper investigates whether industry funding, rather than 
publications or external grants as such, are responsible for pushing researchers towards 
commercialisation. Several papers have shown that industry can provide funds and ideas for 
research (Lee, 2000; Mansfield, 1995; Siegel et al., 2003). Collaboration with industry and other 
applied sponsors may also help overcome the barrier between scientific and commercial activities. 
Contact with pro-commercialisation partners, whether this is an industry sponsor, an academic 
peer or a mentor, positively affects a researcher’s attitude towards patenting as well as her ability 
to recognise commercial opportunities (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001; Ozgen and Baron, 2007; 
Stuart and Ding, 2006). Indeed, Colyvas and Powell (2006), looking at technology transfer 
activities at Stanford University, observe that TTOs and researchers see industry sponsors as 
potential partners for patenting activities, i.e. licensing. Agrawal and Henderson (2002) cite a 
researcher at MIT as saying that industry steers their research towards patenting, thus 
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encouraging a commercial approach to science. Exchanges with the business community and 
joint research projects may hence help to overcome an intrinsic fear of change in academia and 
encourage academics to pursue patenting. One can therefore expect a positive effect of industry 
sponsorship on a researcher’s propensity to patent. 
A positive link between patenting and industry collaboration has already been confirmed in 
several survey studies. Gulbrandsen and Smeby (2005), in a survey of Norwegian academics, 
find a strong positive correlation between patenting and industry collaboration and funding. In a 
more recent study of UK researchers who have received EPSRC funding at least once, Crespi et 
al. (2011) also find that patenting academics are more likely to be involved in other types of 
knowledge transfer. Hottenrott and Thorwarth (2011) find a positive effect of industry 
sponsorship on patent citations for German science and engineering departments. Haeussler and 
Colyvas (2011) look at the existence of entrepreneurial family members and find that it correlates 
positive with patenting. Similarly, Dietz and Bozeman (2005) find that the number of years an 
academic has spent in industry has a positive effect on their patenting rate. All these studies are 
based on survey answers or cross-sections and there is little longitudinal evidence on the topic. 
Most longitudinal studies used industry co-authorship on academic papers as a measure for 
industry collaboration and found mixed evidence ranging from a positive effect on patenting to 
no  or even a negative effect (Azoulay et al., 2007; Breschi et al., 2005; Carayol, 2007). Other 
papers look at industry (co-)ownership of university invented patents and find that industry 
owned academic patents are less basic and hold more immediate financial returns (Czarnitzki et 
al., 2011; Thursby et al., 2009). These papers, however, only consider projects that resulted in 
patents and do not help explain the determinants of patenting itself. There is therefore still a 
requirement for an analysis that measures the link between industry involvement and patenting. 
3  Data and Method 
To investigate the link between industry funds and patenting, we collected longitudinal data on 
academic, commercial and funding histories of 492 tenured engineering academics from ten UK 
universities for the period 1996 to 2007. Initially, researchers were identified using staff registers 
in academic calendars and on university websites, which provided the basis for collecting 
researchers’ publication and patent histories from existing databases. Overall, information on 
Lawson. Academic patenting: The importance of industry support.  
Published in The Journal of Technology Transfer 


almost 4000 academics from 40 UK universities was collected (for a detailed description of the 
data see Banal-Estanol et al. 2010). Ten universities additionally provided information on 
external funding received from industry, government and public bodies for the period 1996 to 
2007 (for a list of universities see Appendix A). The number of academics employed at these ten 
institutions between 1996 and 2007 is 1174. Personal information could only be collected for 816 
researchers. In the final analysis, the number is further reduced to 492, which represents those 
researchers that can be observed for the whole observation period. The data sources used and the 
variables are described below.  
3.1  Data collection and sample 
Data collection started with identifying all engineering departments in the UK and collecting staff 
records from university calendars and websites. Staff information, including full names and 
academic rank, could be recorded for engineering departments at 40 UK universities for a period 
of 22 years from 1986 to 2007. This was supplemented with publication and patent information. 
For each academic in the original dataset, patents stating her as an inventor on a European or 
World patent application were collected from the European Patent Office (EPO) database1. Only 
patents that were filed while she was working in one of the selected engineering departments 
were considered initially. Patents were collected if the academic was named as an inventor, hence, 
not only patents filed by the university but also those assigned to third parties, including industry, 
were recorded. Database construction required a manual search in the inventor database to 
identify those entries where the identity of the academic was certain. This was done by 
comparing addresses, titles and technology classes for all patents potentially attributable to each 
researcher. Information on academic articles published during the observation period was 
extracted from the ISI Science Citation Index (SCI) for each academic in the sample. Entries 
were matched using authors’ names, affiliations and scientific fields.  
As a second step, we approached the research offices of the 40 universities to gain information 
on external funding received by their engineering staff. Ten universities supplied detailed records 
 
1
 Data were collected from the ESPACE ACCESS CD-Rom, a bibliographic information service on European 
and World patent applications. 
Lawson. Academic patenting: The importance of industry support.  
Published in The Journal of Technology Transfer 


on private and public research grants held by their staff during the period 1996 to 20072. This 
included names of principal investigators, funding periods, funding amounts and the natures of 
sponsoring agents. The information was matched with the existing database and resulted in a 
sample of 1174 researchers, which we supplemented with gender, PhD year and PhD subject 
information3. Personal information was only available for 816 researchers and the sample was 
further reduced to those 492 researchers that can be observed for the whole 12-year period or at 
least until 2005. Appendix A reports the number of academics from each university in the 
original and the reduced sample. The sample composition stays largely the same with serious 
undersampling for only one university (University of Reading). 
To address concerns over sample bias we compare the distribution of publication and patent 
numbers of researchers in the selected group of universities to those in other universities during 
the 12-year period. We perform Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions 
(displayed in Appendix B) and find that there is no significant difference between the patenting 
intensity of researchers in the selected group and those at other universities, but that they publish 
more papers in scientific journals. This difference in publication numbers is mainly driven by the 
University of Cambridge and if excluded, we no longer find a significant difference in 
publication distribution between the selected group and other universities. To account for this 
potential bias we will run regression including and excluding the University of Cambridge. 
Further, we analyse whether the distribution of the sample of 1174 researchers at selected 
universities and the subsample of 492 used in this analysis are equal. Again, the equality of 
distributions is analysed using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests but we additionally use analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), which looks at mean differences while controlling by year and academic 
rank4. A significant difference in the distribution of publication numbers can be seen, however, 
once we control for seniority and year there are no significant mean differences between the 
original sample and the selected group. The distribution in the number of patents and the amount 
 
2
 6 more universities sent records for a shorter period, 6 universities sent partial information, e.g. industry funding 
or researcher names were missing and 18 universities chose not to cooperate. For some of the 10 universities 
funding is available for earlier years, e.g. for 3 from 1990 onwards. 
3
 Information was taken from personal websites or the Index to Theses, a listing of theses accepted for higher 
degrees in UK and Ireland. 
4
 Patents, publications and funding differ significantly by calendar year and academic rank. Since we oversample 
on senior researchers due to the need for a long observation period, group differences may be correlated to 
differences in academic rank. 
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and share of funding from industry also does not differ between the two groups. Hence, while 
there is a slight bias towards scientists with higher publication intensity in the selection of the ten 
universities, there is no significant difference in key measures between the group of researchers 
that can be observed for at least ten years and those that are only present for a shorter period, 
indicating that selection bias is unlikely to be a problem in this study as long as we control for 
seniority and calendar year. 
For the subsample of 492 researchers, we additionally collected patents filed before the 
observation period and those filed with the UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO), available 
from the esp@cenet web interface. As each invention can lead to multiple patents, each entry was 
verified using the Derwent World Patents Index (DWPI) that contains information grouped 
around a base patent, thus enabling us to uniquely identify the original invention and avoid 
multiple counts. We collected all patents filed by each of the 492 researchers since 1978, and 
recorded the year of priority (which represents the date closest to invention), the patent applicant 
(which can be different from the inventor and is usually the university or a firm) and the status of 
the patent (applied or granted). Further, we consider patent quality by considering the number of 
forward citations to a patent in the first 5 years following its publication. The quality measure 
was taken from the EP-INV database produced by Kites, Bocconi University, and thus only 
includes citations to patents filed at the EPO. Patents prior to 1978 could not be considered due to 
changes in publication rules in the UK and the establishment of the EPO in the same year5. In 
total, 182 researchers (37%) are inventors (at least one patent application between 1978 and 
2007), and published 585 original patents. 166 patents were issued by the UKIPO, 349 were 
registered at the EPO and 70 at the WIPO that have not yet entered national or regional phase6. 
More than a third of patenting researchers (69 persons) filed only one patent during their entire 
career to date. 47% of patents are assigned to a company alone, 35% to universities and 5% 
jointly to universities and industry. The remaining 13% is owned by government or the inventors 
themselves. This confirms previous papers that showed that in Europe the majority of university 
 
5
 The oldest granted UKIPO patent dates from 1964, indicating that patenting is not a new phenomenon in 
universities in the UK. However, before 1978 the UKIPO only published granted patents, those not granted 
were never published. Following the Patent Act in 1977, the UKIPO started to publish all patents filed under the 
act as patent applications. The EPO was established in 1977 and publishes all European patents as applications. 
6
 A further 42 US patents were found but are not considered as the USPO only started publishing patent 
applications after February 2001. Before March 2001 only granted patents were published. 
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invented patents is not owned by the university but is assigned to industry or the inventors 
themselves (Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Lissoni et al., 2008).  
The final dataset is a panel of 492 researchers from 1996 to 2007 containing patent, funding 
and publication data for each year as well as pre-sample information on patenting. Of the 182 
academic inventors, 145 also filed patents during the observation period 1996 to 2007. The 
majority of researchers (70.5%), however, does not patent during the observation period. Even 
amongst academics who patent during the 12 year period, 71 (49%) do not file more than one 
patent. Hence, the average number of patents in our sample is very low with approximately 0.067 
patents per academic per year and a share of zero observations of 94.25%. This shows that 
patenting is not widely spread amongst university scientists even in applied engineering sciences. 
The average number of publications is 2.21 per academic per year, though we can observe large 
heterogeneity in publication numbers with the maximum number in one year being 30 articles for 
one academic. Researchers receive external funding from five different agents: (1) UK research 
councils, (2) industry, (3) government ministries (excluding research councils), (4) EU, and (5) 
not-for profit organisations. Academics receive more than half of their funding from the UK 
research councils, amounting to an average of 22,603 GBP per academic per year. An average of 
8,892 GBP, 22% of funding, is received from industry sponsors. The other three funding agents 
contribute less than 10% each. 
3.2  Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Table 1 presents descriptions and summary statistics of dependent and independent variables. 
The dependent variables of interest is, firstly, whether a researcher filed at least one patent in a 
given year (dpatit). We expect a positive effect of industry grants on patenting and patent rate.  
It could further be assumed that links to industry may particularly favour patents assigned to 
industry. Firm-owned patents could be the results of consulting (Thursby et al., 2009) or joint 
research projects (Verspagen, 2006). We therefore expect industry sponsorship to increase 
specifically the propensity of filing an industry owned academic patents. Thus, in order to 
account for ownership of patents and under the assumption that industry sponsorship should 
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produce more industry owned patents, we also consider a dummy indpatit that takes the value 1 if 
a patent is owned by a private firm, and a dummy unipatit if a patent is owned by the university.  
Further, industry partners provide expertise in patenting processes and may be better able to 
identify valuable inventions. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) and Thursby et al. (2009) look at university 
owned and industry owned academic patents and find that the latter represent less complex 
inventions that are more likely to produce immediate income to applicant firms. In a recent work, 
Lawson and Sterzi (2012) find that UK academic inventors who first file a patent while working 
in industry produce patents of higher quality, as measured in numbers of forward citations, than 
their purely academic peers, also after joining academia. We therefore also expect industry grants 
to be linked to more successful or higher quality inventions. To control for originality and quality 
of a patent and, again, assuming that industry sponsorship is more likely to produce more 
valuable patents, a dummy grantit indicating granted patents and a dummy nongrantit are used. 
Further, we regress on the number of forward citations received in the first five years since 
application (fwcitit). Only citations before 2012 and to EPO patents are considered. For the 
quality measures (grantit, nongrantit, fwcitit) we only use patents filed before 2006 to allow for 
the necessary time from filing to grant and for citations. 
3.2.2 Main independent variables 
To estimate the effect of funding on patenting we include a measure of industry collaboration 
intensity as well as the amount of funding to account for the extent of external research income. 
To account for the length of a grant and to avoid focusing all the funding on the start of a project, 
the grant value was divided by the length of the grant period and equally distributed across years 
except for the first and last year of a project, which were assigned half-year values as they do not 
represent full years. We generate three-year moving averages of the grant (fundit-1) to account for 
the length of the research projects and to allow for a lag in the effect of external income on 
commercial research activity of more than just one year. To estimate the impact of industry 
funding on patenting propensity we calculate the share of funding received from industry over the 
previous three years (indshareit-1). On average, 25% of funding comes from industry with some 
researchers receiving funding exclusively from private sponsors. The correlation coefficients in 
table 2 show that the share of industry funding correlates stronger with patenting than with 
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publications though both coefficients are very small. Funding in general correlates stronger with 
publication numbers than with patenting.  
However, not all industry grants may have the same purpose. Hottenrott and Lawson (2012) 
show that research motivated by small and medium-sized enterprises has a positive effect on 
patenting rates while large firms effect patenting negatively. The data used in this analysis 
include funding of different magnitudes that could be intended not only for research but also for 
travel, consulting, studentships or knowledge transfer. We differ between small and large grants, 
assuming that the latter is designed to support research and produce publications while the first 
may serve different adjacent activities, e.g. enable dissemination and knowledge transfer. Large 
grants are mainly provided by public agencies with few large grants coming from industry. 
Thursby et al. (2009) and Verspagen (2006) point at such joint research projects as a source of 
industry owned patents in a US and European context. Thus, the large sponsoring contracts with 
industry may indeed increase patenting opportunities for researchers. Small grants on the other 
hand are an indicator of close links to a sponsor, including consulting contracts, part-time 
appointments, joint student supervision or knowledge transfer grants. Thursby et al. (2009) 
suggest that such consulting contracts may hold a better explanation for industry owned academic 
patents. To investigate whether both explanations hold, we differ between research grants and 
small grants. The specific purpose of grants is not denoted in the data and hence the funding 
amount is used to infer the purpose of the grant. We define grants of £50,000 or more as research 
grants and grants of less than £50,000 as small purpose-driven grants7. Instead of the amount of 
funding received through either of the two types of grants, we consider the number of grants in 
either category (fundsmallit-1 and fundresit-1), as well as the share of the number of grants coming 
from industry (indsmallit-1 and indresit-1). The number of grants is more appropriate in this 
context as the value is already represented by the classification itself. Interestingly, industry 
sponsors more than 48% of small grants but just 19% of research grants. Most industry grants 
thus appear to be consulting income or match funding. 
As patenting is expected to occur for very productive researchers, we also include the lagged 
number of publications pubit-1 to the analysis. Table 2 shows that both measures are correlated 
 
7
 Grant values were deflated and represent 2007 equivalent values. Results are very similar if only grants above 
£100,000 are considered research grants. Results also do not differ if amount is chosen instead of grant number. 
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but that funding correlates stronger with publication numbers than with patents. Most previous 
papers have found a positive link between publications and patents; however, few of these have 
included funding as additional explanatory variable. Hottenrott and Lawson (2012) and 
Hottenrott and Thorwarth (2011) considering both external grants and publications, find no 
significant effect of publications on patent numbers, but a positive effect of article citations on 
patent citations. Banal-Estanol et al. (2010) which uses the larger dataset of more than 4000 
academics that also constitutes the basis of this analysis also finds no significant link between 
publications and patents. 
3.2.3 Research group measures 
Researchers are, of course, not only involved in projects in which they appear as a principal 
investigator but may benefit from funding available to other members of their research group as 
either co-investigators or through general benefits associated to increased research income of the 
group. We therefore create several variables that measure the amount and industry collaboration 
intensity of funding received by a researcher’s co-authors. Thus, co-authoring researchers are 
assumed to share research grant benefits. We only take into account co-authors that a researcher 
has published shared work with in years t, t-1 and t+1. Three-year average funding variables are 
calculated for each co-author and then summed to measure the overall funding amount available 
to the group. In doing so, we take into account not only the selected 492 researchers but the full 
sample of 1174 researchers when calculating the co-author funding measures. Still, research 
groups defined this way are only calculated for researchers that publish in scientific journals and, 
as commercially oriented researchers may file patents rather than publish in papers (Owen-Smith 
and Powell, 2001), these variables may underestimate the effect of research group funding on 
academic patenting. In the sample, 76 researchers have no co-authors in their department during 
the entire sample period. Overall, for 47% of person-year observations we cannot assign any co-
authors.  
Additionally to industry, other peers and mentors may affect individual commercialisation 
behaviour. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008), analysing the disclosure activity of researchers at two 
medical schools in the US, find the patenting activity of researchers of similar rank in the same 
department to positively affect an academic’s attitude towards patenting. This is confirmed by 
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Haeussler and Colyvas (2011) in a survey of UK and German life scientists that finds that peers’ 
attitudes towards patenting correlate with a researcher’s involvement in patenting. Several other 
papers also report evidence that the proportion of inventors at the university level and in the 
department has a positive effect on patenting (Breschi et al., 2005; Louis et al., 1989). This paper 
will also consider the patenting history of co-authors in its analysis, to control for local peer 
effects. We calculate the number of patents filed by a researcher’s co-authors prior to observation 
period t and exclude any co-invented patents, only measuring the additional patenting experience 
of co-authors or research group members. The numbers of patents invented by co-authors are 
summed, while avoiding any double counts through co-inventorship. 236 researchers in the 
sample have patenting co-authors. Again, we only consider research partners that have co-
authored on academic papers and may thus underestimate the effect of research group patenting 
experience on the researcher’s propensity to patent.  
3.2.4 Control variables 
In all regression we include variables for different academic ranks to control for differences in 
seniority. Academic rank information was collected from university calendars and denotes the 
four UK ranks: Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Reader and Professor. Lecturer is the reference 
category in all regressions. We follow academics for at least 10 years and therefore observe their 
advancement from lecturer to professor. While in 1996 50% of researchers in the sample are 
lecturers and just 20% professors, this is reversed in 2007 and 46% of the sample have the rank 
of a professor while only 12% are still lecturers. Additionally to seniority in rank, we consider the 
number of years a researcher has spent in academia as the number of years since their PhD (ageit). 
In 1996, the average number of years in academia is 14 years. Thus, assuming that an average 
researcher in the UK receives her PhD at the age of 28, the average age in 1996 was 42. 
Accordingly, in 2007 the average number of years in academia was 25 (age of 53 years). 38 
researchers in the sample do not have a PhD degree and thus no age can be assigned. We include 
a dummy to control for this group and further include a variable for the 26 female researchers. 
Though undoubtedly patenting is prompted primarily by an academic’s desire to solve 
research questions (Levin and Stephan, 1991), it is also affected by the opportunities of the 
scientific field, the nature of rewards associated with patenting and the support given to the 
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academic (Dasgupta and David, 1994). The characteristics of the scientific field and industrial 
relevance of research are important factors in the opportunities for patenting research findings. 
Firstly, not all areas of research produce patentable outcomes, and other forms of commercial 
output and intellectual property, such as software and architectural works, may be generated. 
Secondly, the benefits associated with patenting differ between fields (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2001). It is therefore important to consider the scientific field in all regressions. Academics were 
grouped into engineering departments according to the subject of their PhD. Four subject 
dummies were created, Bioscience, Chemistry & Chemical Engineering (25%), Physics and 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering (37%), Mechanical Engineering (18%) and Civil 
Engineering (20%). Appendix C shows descriptive statistics for patents, publications and funding 
by field. These first statistics show that patenting is most widely spread in electrical and 
electronic engineering as well as chemical engineering. These two fields also show the largest 
average number of publications and citations, indicating a strong link between both types of 
research output. Academics in chemical engineering, however, receive least grants, indicating 
that it requires less financial resources than other engineering fields. There, thus, are significant 
differences between engineering disciplines, as shown by the ANOVA F statistics, and it is 
important to control by research field. University and year dummies are included in all 
regressions to control for university and year fixed effects. 
3.3  Methodology 
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity and potential reverse causality we follow 
Blundell et al. (1995) and estimate a model using pre-sample values of the dependent variable as 
fixed effect proxies. We assume that unobserved heterogeneity in the data is mainly caused by 
the different knowledge stocks with which individuals enter the sample, and that patenting 
experience should contribute positively to a researcher’s propensity to patent. The pre-sample 
value is given by the number of patents filed before 1996. In this sample, 80% of researchers 
have no patents filed before 1996. Theory further suggests that research activity and 
technological innovation are subject to dynamic feedback and it is therefore important to consider 
continuous, sample-period dynamics when modelling patent counts (Blundell et al., 1995). To 
proxy for patenting experience accumulated within the sample period we calculate the stock of 
patents filed during the observation period. Due to the short time window considered in this 
Lawson. Academic patenting: The importance of industry support.  
Published in The Journal of Technology Transfer 



analysis we do not consider that patenting knowledge depreciates during the observation period 
and therefore use the full count of patents. The sample period patenting stock is hence defined as 
the number of patents filed by an academic from 1996 to t-1. 
Thus, to explore the relationship between industry funding and patenting, while considering 
unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic feedback, publication rate and other explanatory factors, we 
estimate the following equation: 
ittiiittititititi wxPeerIndFundPubPstockP ντηγγββββββ ++++++++ −−−−− 21* 1,5* 1,4* 1,31,21,10it ++=)Pr(   
where Pit represents the dependent variable, thus whether a patent was filed or not or the number 
of citations. Pstockit-1 measures a researcher's accumulated patenting stock from 1996 up to t-1, 
Pubit-1 is the number of articles published in t-1; Fund * 1, −ti  represents the researcher's average 
tangible income or numbers of grants during the past three years and Ind * 1, −ti  is the share of 
industry funding during the three years prior to t. Peer * 1, −ti  are several variables indicating the 
patenting and funding activities of co-authoring researchers in the same department and xit are 
other time variant variables, i.e. tenure and age. wi then represents other time invariant 
characteristics including scientific field and university fixed effects, ηi is the individual specific 
fixed effect, measured as pre-sample patenting activity, τt is the time specific fixed effect and νit 
the disturbance term. 
4  Results 
4.1 Basic results 
We firstly estimate several logit models that estimate the propensity to file a patent in t. All 
standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Marginal effects are reported in table 3. 
Model (1) provides a baseline that includes the total amount of received funding and the share 
received from industry plus all controls and the publication measure. Looking at the controls first, 
we see that amongst the tenure variables only the professor category is positive and significant, 
suggesting that professors are more likely to file patents than lecturers, senior lecturers or readers. 
At the same time, the results show a negative age effect, suggesting that younger faculty is more 
likely to patent than their older peers, though the effect is very small. The dummy for researchers 
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that do not hold a PhD is significant and negative. The female dummy is negative but not 
significant. Researchers in mechanical and civil engineering are significantly less likely to file a 
patent than academics in chemical or electrical and electronic engineering. This confirms the 
descriptive statistics and shows that even in engineering there exists great heterogeneity 
concerning patenting opportunities. 
Focussing on our variables of interest, we see that the amount of funding received in the 
previous three years does not predict patenting activity. Thus, research income does not 
necessarily increase the patenting activity of researchers. The share of funds from industry, 
however, is positive and significant. Figure 1 illustrates the predicted probabilities for different 
shares of industry sponsorship while holding all other regressors at their mean. As was already 
visible from table 3, industry sponsorship increases a researcher’s propensity to patent, though 
the overall propensity remains small. Researchers with a higher share of funding from industry 
nonetheless are more likely to file a patent than researchers that receive little or no funding from 
industry. Publications, on the other hand, do not have a significant effect on patenting. 
Model (2) adds co-author funding and model (3) also co-author patent histories. Funding 
received by co-authors has a weak positive effect that is only significant at 10% once we add co-
authors’ patent stock as an explanatory variable. The patenting experience of co-authors is found 
to be positive and significant. Thus, while publication numbers themselves do not explain 
patenting propensity, the funding and, even more so, the patent stock of co-authors on these 
publications have a positive significant effect. Other explanatory variables are not affected.  
In models (4) and (5) we divide the funding variables into research grants and small grants for 
both the individual measures as well as the peer-group measures. The results from the baseline 
regression are confirmed in model (4). The share of industry funding for research grants has a 
positive and significant effect on patenting that is even stronger than in the baseline specification. 
The co-author funding measures are no longer significant. In model (5) we see quite a different 
result. While the number of small grants increases the propensity to patent, industry sponsorship 
is not relevant. Also small grants held by co-authors have a positive significant effect. This shows 
that grants do not act alike and that while the share of large-scale research sponsored by industry 
indeed predicts patenting, small grants up to an amount of £50,000 have a positive effect 
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regardless of the source of funding. These small grants may include industry consulting but also 
studentships or government grants for knowledge transfer and commercialisation. Thus, a large 
number of such purpose-driven grants, whether they come from industry or not and whether they 
are held by the researcher or her co-authors, may also be indicative of the researcher’s patenting 
activity. 
The fixed effect proxy, pre-sample patent control, is significant in all specifications and works 
in the expected direction. Also, the stock of patents is highly significant. The predicted 
probability to patent is increased by 10% if an academic has a patent stock of 10 patents while 
holding all other variables in the model at the mean.  
Appendix B showed that the University of Cambridge may be responsible for a potential 
sample bias that favours the most research active academics. Therefore, in Appendix D, we 
report results from a regression that omits researchers from the University of Cambridge. The 
results are similar to those for the full sample. The amount of funding received in the last three 
years turns significant in models (1) to (3) while models (4) and (5) confirm that this effect is 
generated by small grants. Being a professor is no longer significant but female turns just 
significant. There are thus only minor differences to the main regression and the results may also 
hold if the study were extended to the full sample of 40 universities. 
4.2 Alternative patent measures 
Table 4 reports results for alternative patent measures and specifications. Model (1) presents the 
results of a bivariate probit model for industry owned and university owned patents. Different 
types of patents are estimated jointly as the patent regression explains both the number of 
industry owned and the number of university owned patents. The decisions in favour of one or 
the other (or in fact both) are interrelated and so are their error terms. This is confirmed by the 
likelihood ratio test. Co-author funding measures are not included in these regressions, but do not 
alter the results. The results show that there are some important differences between industry and 
university-owned patents. The share of research funding coming from industry is stronger 
correlated with the propensity to file a patent owned by the university. The effect is weaker and 
only significant at 10% for industry owned patents. Thus, unlike expectations expressed in 
section 2, industry sponsorship does not only increase the propensity to file patents owned by 
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industry, but even more so the propensity to file patents owned by the university. The same is 
true for the number of small research grants. Thus, funding is a better predictor for university 
owned patents. The same is true for publications, which have a positive, though weakly 
significant, effect on university owned patents. Co-author patenting stock, on the other hand, only 
effects industry owned patents, increasing their probability. Also amongst the control variables, 
we can see some important differences between the two types of patents. Women are less likely 
to file patents with industry, but are not significantly different from men with regard to university 
owned patents. While chemical engineering and electrical and electronic engineering academics 
file more patents than civil and mechanical engineers in both categories, electric and electronic 
engineers are most likely to file patents with industry.  
Model (2) estimates a bivariate probit model granted and non-granted patents for a reduced 
pre-2006 sample. Again, we can assume that the processes behind filing a patent are interrelated 
and independent from the later granting decision. This is confirmed by the LR test statistic. The 
results show that the intensity of industry research income is correlated with the probability of 
filing a patent that will later be granted. Small grants also have a stronger effect on successful 
patents. Purpose-driven grants and perhaps industry guidance may thus help to finance and guide 
the lengthy and expensive patenting process. The patenting history of co-authors equally affects 
the probability of filing any type of patent. 
Models (3) and (4) report the results of left-censored tobit estimations for the number of 
forward citations and, for comparison, for the number of patent applications. Tobit estimators are 
chosen due to the large number of zero observations that require left censoring. Pre-sample and 
patent stock variables are based on the dependent variables; i.e. in model (3) they denote the 
number of citations to past patents. Further, we differ between two types of zero outcomes for the 
citation count: a) zero EPO patents, and b) zero citations, by adding 0.001 to each EPO patent 
and censoring at zero, i.e. censoring all observations with zero EPO patents. The results for the 
citation measure are similar to those of the count measure in model (4). Only the coefficient for 
the share of industry research funding is slightly larger for citations, indicating that industry 
sponsorship may have a positive impact on the quality of patents. 
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4.3 Robustness check 
The results are verified using additional specifications in table 5 that estimate the patent hazard 
rate h(t) of a researcher, the probability that a researcher will patent t years after their last patent. 
We allow multiple patenting events for each researcher and, as we expect reoccurring patenting 
events to be highly correlated, we adopt a proportional hazard model that allows for unobserved 
heterogeneity (frailty model). Frailty models have previously been used in the analysis of 
patenting risk and patent citation hazards (e.g. Breschi et al., 2005; Marco, 2007) and given 
evidence for unobserved heterogeneity amongst researchers or patents. Shared frailty is also 
confirmed by the LR test statistic in the regressions reported here. One problem poses itself in the 
hazard model: we only observe a 12-year period and are unable to estimate the effect of industry 
collaboration on patenting before 1996. However, we know that 20% of researchers patented 
before 1996 and have been at risk of patenting again since their last patent. We therefore specify 
time t as the number of years since the last patent, or since the year of PhD for researchers that 
have not filed any patents prior to 19968, and specify the year 1996 as the year when a researcher 
came under observation. Table 5 presents the results of the frailty model, which confirm the 
results of the logit estimations in table 3. Researchers with a high share of industry funding in the 
three years prior to t are more at risk of patenting, especially if this funding is supporting research. 
Researchers receiving a large number of small grants also increase the hazard rate of patenting. 
Publications are not found to have a significant impact on patenting after we include the funding 
activity of co-authors. Co-author’s patenting stock is also positive but only significant at 10%. 
The results also confirm the field effects with researchers in Chemical and Electrical and 
Electronic Engineering having a higher risk to patent than researchers in other fields of 
engineering. 
5 Conclusion 
The literature on knowledge transfer from universities to industry has largely focussed on 
university inventions and overlooked the importance of other collaboration channels in 
facilitating academic patenting. This study focuses on the effect that funding sourcing practices 
of researchers have on their propensity to patent. Based on a longitudinal sample of UK 
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 The earliest possible reference year is 1978, which represents the first year we measure patent activity. 
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researchers we show that academics receiving funding from industry are more likely to produce 
patents, controlling for a variety of individual and departmental characteristics. We conclude that, 
as already argued by e.g. Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) or Owen-Smith and Powell (2001), the 
support of pro-commercialisation partners is key in steering researchers towards patenting. We 
find the effect of an industry partner to be strongest and most consistent in explaining the 
propensity to patent. This confirms results from survey studies (Crespi et al., 2011; Gulbrandsen 
and Smeby, 2005) and anecdotal evidence (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Colyvas and Powell, 
2006), indicating a pull or learning effect from industry. Partners from industry perhaps have a 
strong interest in pushing academics towards commercialisation to recover their research 
investments or are more likely to sponsor research for commercial application. However, the 
effect is even stronger for university owned patents indicating that industry involvement 
generally increases a researcher’s preparedness to involve in patenting. Small grants have a 
positive effect on patenting regardless the source of the grant. These small grants, which may 
support dissemination activities, studentships and consulting are indicative of close links to 
sponsors and ability to source money for knowledge transfer and other research dissemination 
activities, including patenting. 
The findings inform universities of the need for joint research and technology transfer units. In 
the wake of the Bayh-Dole Act and similar policies in the UK and Europe universities set up 
dedicated Technology Transfer Offices in an effort to commercialise research. Often, these were 
separate from research offices that have traditionally provided administrative support for the 
acquisition of external funding. Our results indicate that the commercialisation efforts of 
universities cannot be isolated from other knowledge transfer activities. This is particularly the 
case for industry sponsorship and for acquiring small dissemination grants from a variety of 
sponsors. The results are further interesting to universities as they show that researchers receiving 
external grants will not necessarily hand rights to inventions to the external sponsor but are also 
more likely to file patents with the university.  
Finally, with universities’ budgets shrinking and industry sponsored research increasing as a 
share of funding in some countries the question of a shift in academic research is still important. 
While industry sponsorship encourages patenting activity at universities, this may come at the 
expense of basic research. Several papers have argued that industry sponsored research is more 
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applied and may decrease publication output (e.g. Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011; Banal-Estanol 
et al., 2010). Thus, while most papers currently find a positive or no effect of patenting on 
publications (e.g. Azoulay et al., 2009) this may change dramatically if more research is 
sponsored by industry. A policy that encourages a shift in research funding from public to private 
sponsorship will need to take this into account. 
This paper has added some important evidence to the discussion on university-industry 
collaboration and its role in academic patenting, but has some limitations. The nature and purpose 
of grants could only be inferred and needs to be investigated in more detail to understand whether 
industry sponsors commercial research or whether it is more efficient in steering academics 
towards exploitation of research. Characteristics of sponsoring firm may be crucial in explaining 
either strategy as some firms may benefit from academic research more than others (e.g. Cohen et 
al., 2002). It is thus necessary to acquire more information on sponsors and projects to draw 
stronger conclusions. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Regression Variables Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable   
    
dpatit Dummy = 1 if patents filed by individual i in t 5320 0.053 0.224   
indpatit Dummy = 1 if patents by individual i in t owned 
by industry 
5320 0.026 0.159   
unipatit Dummy = 1 if patents by individual i in t owned 
by university 
5320 0.032 0.176   
grantpatit Dummy = 1 if granted patents by individual i in t 5320 0.026 0.158   
nograntpatit Dummy = 1 if filed but not granted patents by 
individual i in t 
5320 0.030 0.171   
patit Number of filed patents by individual i in t 5320 0.067 0.346 0 9 
fwcitit Number of forward citations to patents filed by 
individual i in t 
5320 0.032 0.368 0 9 
Patentstock 
 
     
prepati Patents filed before 1996 5320 0.470 1.436 0 18 
patstockit-1 Patent stock from 1996 to t-1 5320 0.375 1.239 0 19 
prefwciti Citations to patents filed before 1996 5320 0.375 1.860 0 22 
fwcitstockit-1 Patent citation stock from 1996 to t-1 5320 0.246 1.507 0 32 
Funding   
    
fundit-1 Average amount of funding received in previous 
3 years (in £10000) 
5320 3.392 9.231 0 160.5 
fundresit-1 Average number of grants >= £50,000 in 
previous 3 years 
5320 0.915 1.687 0 18 
fundsmallit-1 Average number of grants < £50,000 in previous 
3 years 
5320 0.732 1.675 0 27 
indshareit-1 Share of funding from industry over previous 3 
years 
5320 12.73% 28.07% 0% 100% 
indresit-1 Share of industry grants >= £50,000 in previous 
3 years 
5320 8.50% 22.78% 0% 100% 
indsmallit-1 Share of industry grants < £50,000 in previous 3 
years 
5320 19.34% 35.66% 0% 100% 
Publications       
pubit-1 Number of publications in t-1 5320 2.209 3.176 0 30 
Research group   
    
peerfundit-1 Average amount of funding of co-authors (in 
£10000) 
5320 4.705 13.506 0 160.5 
peerfundresit-1 Average number of co-authors' grants >= 
£50,000 (prev. 3 years) 
5320 1.193 2.852 0 48 
peerfundsmallit-1 Average number of co-authors' grants < £50,000  
(prev. 3 years) 
5320 0.947 2.817 0 53 
peerindshareit-1 Share of co-authors' funding from industry (prev. 
3 years) 
5320 7.70% 20.35% 0% 100% 
peerindresit-1 Share of co-authors' industry grants >= £50,000 
(prev. 3 years) 
5320 5.87% 17.31% 0% 100% 
peerindsmallit-1 Share of co-authors' industry grants < £50,000 
(prev. 3 years) 
5320 14.06% 29.69% 0% 100% 
peerpatit-1 Co-authors' patent stock up to t-1 5320 0.407 1.445 0 23 
Control variables   
    
Lecturerit Dummy - reference category 5320 0.248 0.432   
Senior Lecturerit Dummy 5320 0.292 0.454   
Readerit Dummy 5320 0.127 0.332   
Professorit Dummy 5320 0.333 0.332   
ageit Years since PhD 4913 19.96 9.367 0 49 
nophdi Dummy 5320 0.076 0.266   
femalei Dummy 5320 0.053 0.224   
Chemical Engineeringi Dummy - reference category 5320 0.228 0.419 
  
Mechanical Engineeringi Dummy 5320 0.170 0.376   
Electrical and Electronici Dummy 5320 0.341 0.474   
Civil Engineeringi Dummy 5320 0.184 0.388 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
  
dpatit pubit-1 fundit-1 indshareit-1 fundresit-1 indresit-1 fundsmallit-1 
pubit-1 0.1072 * 
fundit-1 0.1139 * 0.2417 * 
indshareit-1 0.0628 * 0.0190    0.1266 * 
fundresit-1 0.1335 * 0.3318 * 0.7549 * 0.1871 * 
indresit-1 0.0916 * 0.0438    0.2083 * 0.6819 * 0.3195 * 
fundsmallit-1 0.0996 * 0.1865 * 0.3723 * 0.2083 * 0.4892 * 0.1675 * 
indsmallit-1 0.0640 * 0.0755 * 0.2339 * 0.5663 * 0.3280 * 0.2802 * 0.3777 * 
* p<0.001 
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Table 3: Logistic regressions of patenting probability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Margins Margins Margins Margins Margins 
Patentstock 
prepati 0.005** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
patstockit-1 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Funding 
fundit-1 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
fundresit-1 0.004* 
 (0.002) 
fundsmallit-1 0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
indshareit-1 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) 
indresit-1 0.035*** 
 (0.010) 
indsmallit-1 0.015 
 (0.009) 
Publications 
pubit-1 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Research group 
peerpatit-1 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
peerfundit-1 0.001** 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
peerfundresit-1 0.001 
 (0.001) 
peerfundsmallit-1 0.003** 
 (0.001) 
peerindshareit-1 0.006 0.005 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
peerindresit-1 0.011 
 (0.016) 
peerindsmallit-1 0.006 
 (0.011) 
Control variables 
Lecturerit reference category 
Senior Lecturerit 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Readerit 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Professorit 0.026** 0.026** 0.025** 0.019 0.021* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
ageit -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
nophdi -0.160*** -0.159*** -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.152*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
femalei -0.025 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 -0.022 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Chemical Engineeringi reference category 
Mechanical Engineeringi -0.032** -0.034*** -0.034** -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Electrical and Electronici 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Civil Engineeringi -0.030** -0.029** -0.029** -0.031** -0.029** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Observations 5,320 5,320 5,320 5,320 5,320 
Log Likelihood -934.1 -930.1 -927.8 -923.0 918.0 
Wald χ2 219.59*** 249.17*** 244.77*** 275.04*** 265.41*** 
Ps-R2 (McFadden's) 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 
University and Year fixed effects included. Marginal effects are reported.  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Regressions for alternative patenting measures 
  
(1)   (2)   (3) (4) 
Bivariate Probit Bivariate Probit Tobit Tobit 
Variable Industry owned 
patents 
University 
owned patents 
  Granted 
patens 
Not-granted 
patents 
  EPO Citations All patents 
Patentstock 
prepati / prefwciti 0.058** 0.057** 0.043** 0.060** 0.122*** 0.144*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.025) (0.029) (0.052) 
patstockit-1 / fwcitstocki-1 0.190*** 0.0784*** 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.264*** 0.363*** 
 (0.039) (0.0260) (0.032) (0.025) (0.028) (0.047) 
Funding 
fundresit-1 0.015 -0.007 0.013 0.024 0.044 0.048 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.090) (0.056) 
fundsmallit-1 0.063* 0.073** 0.0453* 0.043 0.131* 0.154*** 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.071) (0.058) 
indresit-1 0.322* 0.403*** 0.431*** 0.212 1.157*** 0.901*** 
 (0.167) (0.146) (0.148) (0.178) (0.365) (0.278) 
indsmallit-1 0.041 0.117 -0.013 0.130 -0.117 0.107 
 (0.143) (0.121) (0.138) (0.132) (0.352) (0.240) 
Publications 
pubit-1 0.001 0.021* 0.005 0.009 0.012 0.019 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.036) (0.027) 
Research group 
peerpatit-1 0.052*** 0.032 0.040* 0.049*** 0.123** 0.113*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.053) (0.033) 
Control variables 
Lecturerit reference category 
Senior Lecturerit 0.159 -0.043 -0.011 -0.004 0.059 0.101 
 (0.131) (0.134) (0.125) (0.149) (0.329) (0.238) 
Readerit 0.075 0.099 0.225 -0.045 0.331 0.289 
 (0.162) (0.174) (0.157) (0.184) (0.418) (0.311) 
Professorit 0.042 0.168 0.202 0.081 0.516 0.322 
 (0.170) (0.147) (0.156) (0.162) (0.404) (0.282) 
ageit 
-0.015** -0.012** -0.013** -0.013** -0.036** -0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.011) 
nophdi 
-0.952** -4.571*** -1.011*** -4.493*** -3.285*** -3.054*** 
 (0.395) (0.235) (0.374) (0.171) (1.060) (0.870) 
femalei 
-0.548* -0.083 -0.120 -0.148 -0.343 -0.450 
 (0.291) (0.198) (0.245) (0.225) (0.534) (0.346) 
Chemical Engineeringi reference category 
Mechanical Engineeringi 
-0.270 -0.507*** -0.412*** -0.326** -1.207*** -0.916*** 
 (0.172) (0.132) (0.153) (0.140) (0.445) (0.288) 
Electrical and Electronici 0.216* -0.068 -0.012 0.077 0.116 0.233 
 (0.130) (0.112) (0.111) (0.110) (0.293) (0.198) 
Civil Engineeringi -0.155 -0.514*** -0.228 -0.632*** -1.125*** -0.742** 
 (0.169) (0.139) (0.177) (0.176) (0.429) (0.296) 
 
Constant 
-2.073*** -2.347*** -2.150*** -1.892*** -5.416*** -4.538*** 
 (0.293) (0.244) (0.249) (0.230) (0.869) (0.533) 
 
Observations 5,320 5,320 4,428 4,428 4,428 5,320 
Log Likelihood -1090.6 -959.3 -809.4 -1242.4 
Wald χ2 1969.87*** 8680.48*** 
ρ 0.382*** 0.217*** 
F 6.96*** 14.28*** 
σ 2.773*** 2.372*** 
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Ps-R2 (McFadden's)         0.11 0.14 
University and Year fixed effects included. Coefficients are reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Proportional hazard estimation (shared-frailty) of patenting. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
Patentstock 
prepati 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.217*** 0.221*** 0.215*** 
 (0.0779) (0.0765) (0.0756) (0.0746) (0.0733) 
patstockit-1 0.179*** 0.183*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.205*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0389) 
Funding 
fundit-1 0.009 0.007 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
fundresit-1 0.084* 
 (0.044) 
fundsmallit-1 0.118*** 
 (0.044) 
indshareit-1 0.443* 0.425* 0.438* 
 (0.240) (0.240) (0.239) 
indresit-1 0.846*** 
 (0.300) 
indsmallit-1 0.350* 
 (0.205) 
Publications 
pubit-1 0.044* 0.032 0.030 0.024 0.020 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Research group 
peerpatit-1 0.042* 0.046* 0.045* 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
peerfundit-1 0.008** 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
peerfundresit-1 0.015 
 (0.020) 
peerfundsmallit-1 0.045* 
 (0.024) 
peerindshareit-1 0.217 0.202 
 (0.296) (0.297) 
peerindresit-1 0.474 
 (0.350) 
peerindsmallit-1 0.075 
 (0.224) 
Control variables 
Lecturerit reference category 
Senior Lecturerit 0.173 0.178 0.172 0.140 0.189 
 (0.254) (0.252) (0.252) (0.252) (0.252) 
Readerit 0.309 0.317 0.338 0.267 0.279 
 (0.290) (0.289) (0.289) (0.290) (0.286) 
Professorit 0.706** 0.710** 0.705** 0.558* 0.569** 
 (0.291) (0.290) (0.289) (0.296) (0.288) 
ageit -0.038** -0.037** -0.038** -0.033** -0.034** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
nophdi -3.898*** -3.884*** -3.861*** -3.770*** -3.752*** 
 (1.101) (1.098) (1.096) (1.096) (1.089) 
femalei -0.570 -0.550 -0.533 -0.493 -0.488 
 (0.521) (0.518) (0.513) (0.527) (0.504) 
Chemical Engineeringi reference category 
Mechanical Engineeringi -0.767** -0.811** -0.794** -0.925*** -0.843** 
 (0.343) (0.343) (0.342) (0.345) (0.337) 
Electrical and Electronici 0.441* 0.395 0.412 0.382 0.409 
 (0.261) (0.259) (0.258) (0.258) (0.251) 
Civil Engineeringi -0.837** -0.820** -0.801** -0.840** -0.786** 
 (0.337) (0.335) (0.334) (0.335) (0.328) 
 
θ 2.221*** 2.157*** 2.108*** 2.071*** 1.908*** 
Log Likelihood -1793.8 -1791.5 -1790.2 -1785.1 -1784.2 
Wald χ2 133.00*** 137.87*** 141.75*** 150.93*** 156.49*** 
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Observations 5,320 5,320 5,320 5,320 5,320 
No of Failures 282 282 282 282 282 
University and Year fixed effects included. Coefficients are reported.  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Fig. 1: Predicted patenting probabilities at means along with confidence interval 
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Appendix A: List of universities 
 
    University Name Academics in Sample                                                
# and %  
Academics in Department                                                     
# and % 
University of Cambridge 92 18.7% 199 17.0% 
University of Durham 13 2.6% 43 3.7% 
University of Glasgow 57 11.6% 125 10.6% 
University of Lancaster 9 1.8% 31 2.6% 
University of Leicester 22 4.5% 34 2.9% 
Loughborough University 99 20.1% 251 21.4% 
University of Reading 8 1.6% 40 3.4% 
University of Sheffield 82 16.7% 164 14.0% 
University of Strathclyde 72 14.6% 203 17.3% 
University of Swansea 38 7.7% 84 7.2% 
Total 492 100.0% 1174 100.0% 
 
Appendix B: Sample distribution differences 
  Mean 
Sample universities                                            
n=1174 
Mean 
Other universities                                       
n=3214 
Diff. Distribution                                
Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test 
Anova                  
F
Number of Patents (96-04) 0.540 (0.003) 0.475 (0.002) 0.0030 3.26 
Number of Publications (96-07) 2.045 (0.030) 1.753 (0.016) 0.0285 * 76.23 * 
  without Cambridge                                  
n=975 
Other universities                                            
n=3214 
Diff. Distribution                        
K-S test 
Anova                  
F 
Number of Patents (96-04) 0.429 (0.003) 0.475 (0.002) 0.0039 1.31 
Number of Publications (96-07) 1.770 (0.028) 1.753 (0.016) 0.0061 0.01 
  Final Sample Rest Diff. Distribution                                Anova 
  n=492 n=682 K-S test F 
Number of Patents (96-04) 0.059 (0.005) 0.052 (0.005) 0.0058 0.17 
Number of Publications (96-07) 2.205 (0.042) 1.821 (0.043) 0.0869 * 0.50 
Industry Funding Share (96-07) 0.288 (0.016) 0.261 (0.024) 0.0600 0.00 
Industry Funding (96-07) in £10000  2.189 (2.075) 1.122 (1.081) 0.0351 8.41 
ANOVA controlling for year and academic rank. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.001 
 
Appendix C: Means by engineering field  
  
dpatit pubit-1 fundit-1 indshareit-1 
Chemical Engineering 0.062 (0.245)  3.019 (3.534) 2.394 (9.257) 0.210 (0.328) 
Mechanical Engineering 0.031 (0.178) 1.871 (2.708) 3.517 (6.420) 0.291 (0.359) 
Electrical and Electronic Engineering 0.083 (0.280) 2.669 (3.732) 4.549 (11.01) 0.247 (0.357) 
Civil Engineering 0.027 (0.171) 1.302 (1.788) 2.775 (7.544) 0.243 (0.342) 
Number of Observations 5320 5320 5320 2719 
Anova F 16.05 * 51.93 * 11.18 * 3.31 
ANOVA controlling for year and academic rank. Standard deviations in parentheses. * p<0.001 
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Appendix D: Logistic regression of patenting probability (without Cambridge). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Margins Margins Margins Margins Margins 
Patentstock 
prepati 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
patstockit-1 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Funding 
fundit-1 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
fundresit-1 0.004 
 (0.003) 
fundsmallit-1 0.004** 
 (0.002) 
indshareit-1 0.020** 0.022** 0.023** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
indresit-1 0.035*** 
 (0.011) 
indsmallit-1 0.014 
 (0.009) 
Publications 
pubit-1 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Research group 
peerpatit-1 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
peerfundit-1 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
peerfundresit-1 0.004** 
 (0.002) 
peerfundsmallit-1 0.002** 
 (0.001) 
peerindshareit-1 0.010 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
peerindresit-1 0.008 
 (0.017) 
peerindsmallit-1 0.007 
 (0.011) 
Control variables 
Lecturerit reference category 
Senior Lecturerit 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Readerit 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Professorit 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.016 0.016 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
ageit -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
nophdi -0.121*** -0.117*** -0.115*** -0.111*** -0.112*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) 
femalei -0.030* -0.030* -0.030* -0.023 -0.030* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Chemical Engineeringi reference category 
Mechanical Engineeringi -0.030** -0.031** -0.030** -0.033*** -0.030** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Electrical and Electronici 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Civil Engineeringi -0.033** -0.031** -0.031** -0.030** -0.027** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
 
Observations 4,332 4,332 4,332 4,332 4,332 
Log Likelihood -686.6 -681.0 -678.0 -674.2 -676.3 
Wald χ2  219.88***  238.80*** 295.80*** 270.99*** 311.48*** 
Ps-R2 (McFadden's) 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
University and Year fixed effects included. Marginal effects are reported.  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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